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DISCOVERY AND USE
OF CHURCH RECORDS
BY CIVIL
AUTHORITIES
DAVID J. YOUNG, ESQUIRE*
STEVEN W. TIGGES, ESQUIRE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The general subject of this outline is the defenses which may be
available to avoid a subpoena duces tecum which seeks church-related
documents and records. The outline is organized in terms of four substan-
tive issues: (1) whether the underlying action in which church records are
sought is a proper subject of civil jurisdiction, or otherwise whether com-
pelled disclosure of the records would entangle the government with the
church in violation of the Establishment Clause; (2) whether compelled
disclosure of church records or the use to which the documents will be
put violates the Free Exercise Clause; (3) whether compelled disclosure
infringes upon First Amendment rights of free speech and association;
and (4) whether the documents sought by the subpoena are protected by
a nonconstitutional privilege, such as the priest-penitent privilege. The
final part of this outline briefly discusses some of the procedural ques-
tions which may arise in an attempt to quash a subpoena which seeks
church documents.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL JURISDICTION
The initial issues in any instance where church-related records are
sought is whether the underlying governmental action (litigation, admin-
istrative investigation, etc.) is properly the subject of civil jurisdiction. If
it is not, then the requested documents need not be disclosed.' The Reli-
gion Clauses - in particular, the Establishment Clause and its prohibi-
* Murphey, Young & Smith, Columbus, Ohio.
Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 74 (1st Cir. 1979).
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tion of "excessive entanglement" between church and state - impose a
limit on the extent to which civil authorities can take congnizance of
church-related disputes.
A. Three-Part Test
Establishment questions are decided by a three-part test. According
to Lemon v. Kurtzman2 : "First, the statute [or other exercise of civil au-
thority] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion
.; finally, the statute [or other action] must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion."'
B. Entanglement
The entanglement prong of the test first appeared in Walz v. Tax
Commission 4 although its origins can be traced back to Watson v.
Jones,5 and other early cases. The concept is primarily concerned with
government involvement with religious interests.
1. Administrative Entanglement
In Walz, the Court defined three types of administrative entangle-
ment that must be avoided: substantive "government evaluation" of reli-
gious practices;6 involvement of "government in difficult classifications of
what is or is not religious,";" and extensive state investigation into church
operations and finances. '
2. Underlying Rationale
The administrative entanglement concerns expressed in Walz are
based on two of the fundamental premises of the Religion Clauses. Each
is discussed briefly below.
a. Chilling Effect
Government involvement with religious interest, particularly when it
take the form of ongoing administrative investigation and regulation, can
pose a substantial danger of chilling and coercing religious decision-mak-
2 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3 Id. at 612-13.
4 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
80 U.S. 679 (1871).
' Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
Id. at 698 (Harlan, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN, 1986
ing.' For example, ongoing state evaluation and supervision of the tuition
charges by Catholic schools can result in impermissible state intrusion
upon decisions by school authorities regarding how funds should be allo-
cated between the religious and secular programs of the schools. 0
b. State Definition of Religion
The second basis for the entanglement concept, and perhaps the
more important one, is that government must not become involved in de-
fining what is or is not "religious.""
C. Entanglement Limits On Civil Authority
The foregoing entanglement concerns have led to three interrelated
lines of cases which limit civil jurisdiction over church-related matters.
Each is discussed below.
1. Church Property Disputes
In a line of cases such as Watson v. Jones, 2 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral,3 Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church,4 Maryland & Virginia
Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God ad Sharpsburg,15 and
Jones v. Wolf,'6 the Court has held that a civil court can decide church
property disputes (i.e., which faction of a hierarchical church is entitled
to church property after a schism within the local church or between the
local church and the general church) only in accordance with "neutral
principles of law," such as settled principles of the law of property, trusts,
and corporations or unincorporated associations. The court cannot decide
questions of religious doctrine or dogma. If such a question arises in the
9 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 496 (1979).
'o Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 76 (1st Cir. 1979).
" West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("[if there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it. is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in ... religion or other matters of opinion"); United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 620 ("state inspection
and evaluation of the religious content of a religious organization is fraught with the sort of
entanglement that the Constitution forbids"); P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION
26 (1964) ("a principal purpose underlying religious liberty is to remove the question of
what is true religion from the domain of secular authority"). But see United States v. Moon,
718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983) ("in this criminal proceeding the jury was not bound to
accept the . . . Church's definition of what constitutes a religious use or purpose").
" 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
13 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
" 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
" 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
16 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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course of litigation, the court must defer to and accept the decision of the
governing body or highest ecclesiastical tribunal of the general church.
2. Other Church-Related Disputes
Religious disputes which do not involve control of church property
(e.g., questions of church discipline, such as where an expelled member of
the congregation sues his church claiming that the expulsion was in viola-
tion of church doctrine), or which only incidentally involve such issues
(e.g., litigation over the validity of the defrockment of a bishop which
incidentally involves who is entitled to property formerly controlled by
the bishop), can be decided only in accordance with the decisions, doc-
trines, and policies of the proper church authorities, without regard to
"neutral principles."
The courts cannot decide what constitutes church doctrine or policy,
but must instead defer to the church tribunals and governing bodies." In
such a case, a strong argument can be made that civil jurisdiction is en-
tirely ousted by the first Amendment.
a. Ecclesiastical Issues
The distinction between cases involving church discipline, doctrine,
administration, and organization, which arguable cannot be the subject of
civil jurisdiction, and cases involving church property, which can be re-
solved by civil courts, but only in accordance with neutral principles of
law, lies in the fact that the former cases by their very nature cannot be
adjudicated by reference to neutral principles, since they involve purely
ecclesiastical matters.18
b. Serbian Eastern Orthodox
The leading case is Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich,'9 in which a defrocked bishop sued his general church,
claiming that the defrockment was wrongful and arbitrary under the in-
ternal doctrines of the general church, and seeking a declaration that he
therefore remained in control of the diocesan property. The Illinois Su-
preme Court ruled in favor of the bishop, but the United States Supreme
"' Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) ("religious
controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and . .. a civil court must
accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them").
11 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 879 (1978) ("whatever room the First Amend-
ment might leave for independent civil resolution of secular but church-related disputes
through neutral principles of law, it leaves no room whatever for independent civil adjudica-
tion of questions . . . at the core of ecclesiastical concern").
19 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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Court reversed, holding that "questions of church discipline and the com-
position of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical con-
cern." 0 "[Tihe Illinois Supreme Court has undertaken the resolution of
quintessentially unconstitutionally religious controversies whose resolu-
tion the First Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiasti-
cal tribunals of .. . [the] church."2 "[T]he Supreme Court of Illinois
substituted its interpretation of the . . . [cjhurch constitution[s] for that
of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals in which church law vests authority
to make that interpretation. This the First and Fourteenth Amendments
forbid.12 2 The Court further stated:
"[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious or-
ganizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal disci-
pline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over
these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are
created to decide disputes over the government and direction of subordinate
bodies, the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as
binding upon them. 22
Cases following the Serbian Eastern Orthodox rationale are discussed
below.
(i) In Kaufmann v. Sheehan,2 the Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a
defamation and "denial of ecclesiastical due process" suit by a Catholic
priest against his bishop, on the ground that the plaintiff's claims related
to his status and employment as a priest, matters which are exclusively
reserved to internal church authorities.
(ii) In Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 5 the court refused to ex-
tend jurisdiction over a RICO claim brought by one religious faction
against a rival faction, on the ground that the court would have to decide
who was the true leader of the religion, a purely ecclesiastical issue.
(iii) In Nunn v. Black,26 the court dismissed an action brought by ex-
pelled church members who claimed that the expulsion was wrongful, on
the ground that matters of internal church discipline are beyond the
bounds of civil jutisdiction.
c. Doctrine Still Developing
The precise scope of the doctrine announced in Serbian Eastern Or-
so Id. at 717.
21 Id. at 720.
"2 Id. at 721.
2 Id. at 724-25.
24 707 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1983).
' 566 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
26 506 F. Supp. 444 (W.D.Va. 1981).
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thodox is open to question.
(i) In Serbian Eastern Orthodox, the Court left open the issue of whether
a purely ecclesiastical decision can nevertheless be attacked in civil court
on the narrow grounds of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness."
(ii) In General Council on Finance and Administration, United Method-
ist Church v. California Superior Court,2 Justice Rehnquist, as Circuit
Justice, denied a stay of proceedings in a California state court, partly
based on his view that the Serbian Eastern Orthodox rule did not apply
to the case. The applicant for the stay was a defendant in a breach of
contract and fraud action in state court arising out of the business failure
of a nursing home affiliated with the Methodist Church. The defendant
General Council had moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
relying on the constitution and bylaws of the Methodist Church and on
testimony of church officials as to the Council's role in the church hierar-
chy. The trial court rejected the evidence offered by the Council and
reached a contrary interpretation of the church constitution and bylaws.
The Council argued that the trial court's independent evaluation of
church doctrine violated the Serbian Eastern Orthodox rule that civil
courts cannot inquire into matters of church doctrine and organization.
Justice Rehnquist disagreed, ruling that:
applicant plainly is wrong when it asserts that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prevent a civil court from independently examining, and mak-
ing the ultimate decision regarding the structure and actual operation of a
hierarchical church and its constituent units in an action such as this. There
are constitutional limitations on the extent to which a civil court may in-
quire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity in
adjudicating intra-church disputes . . . . But this Court never has sug-
gested that those constraints . . . apply outside the context of ... intra-
organization disputes. Thus, Serbian Eastern Orthodox and the other cases
cited by applicant are not in point. Those cases are premised on a perceived
danger that in resolving intra-church disputes the State will become entan-
gled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups
espousing particular doctrinal beliefs. . . . Such considerations are not ap-
plicable to purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular
defendant, albeit a religious affiliated organization, in which fraud, breach
of contract, and statutory violations are alleged.2
Whether Justice Rehnquist's views will be adopted by the full Court is
questionable. It should be noted that Justice Rehnquist dissented in Ser-
bian Eastern Orthodox.
" See also Maryland & Virginia Eldership v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
20 439 U.S. 1369 (1978).
1, Id. at 1372-73.
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(iii) In Ambassador College v. Geotzke,30 discussed in greater detail in
Part III(B)(2) infra, the court followed Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
United Methodist Council and held that Serbian Eastern Orthodox does
not apply to private litigation which does not involve an intra-church
dispute.
(iv) A number of courts have held that religious organizations are subject
to the employment discrimination prohibitions of Title VII,31 even where
the alleged discriminatory treatment is a form of internal church disci-
pline for the employee's violation of church doctrine.2
3. Ongoing State Regulation
In addition to the foregoing limits on civil jurisdiction over ecclesias-
tical disputes, it is settled that government has no authority to engage in
ongoing investigation and regulation of church-related organizations if
such action could lead to a chilling effect on the free exercise of religion
or an impermissible entanglement of government defining what is or is
not "religious."
a. Catholic Bishop Rule
The leading case is NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,33 which involved
whether the National Labor Relations Board can assert jurisdiction over
lay faculty members at Catholic schools. The Seventh Circuit denied en-
forcement of the NLRB order asserting jurisdiction, both on statutory
and constitutional grounds, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Although
the Court purported to rest its decision on the labor statutes, it also en-
gaged in a detailed discussion of the First Amendment entanglement con-
cerns. The Court perceived at least two instances where NLRB jurisdic-
tion over church school teachers could create risks of entanglement. First,
in many instances Catholic schools would defend unfair labor practice
charges on the grot.nd that the "challenged actions were mandated by
their religious creeds." According to the Court: "The resolution of such
so 675 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1982).
31 See EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981);
EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
n See EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); Dayton Chris-
tian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, Case No. C-3-80-410 (S.D. Ohio 1984). But see
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that Title VII
cannot be applied to the employment relationship between a church and its ministers be-
cause such matters "must necessarily be recognized as a prime ecclesiastical concern"). Also,
it should be noted that § 702 of Title VII exempts religious organizations from employment
discrimination based on religious considerations - i.e., religious organizations can discrimi-
nate in favor of members of their faith.
33 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd., 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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charges . . . will necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the po-
sition asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to the
school's religious mission. It is not only the conclusions that may be
reached by the Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the
Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to findings
and conclusions".3 4 Second, the Court noted that the NLRB would decide
the "terms and conditions" of the Catholic teachers' employment, and
that "[ilnevitably the Board's inquiry will implicate sensitive issues that
open the door to conflicts between clergy-administrators and the Board,
or conflicts with negotiators for unions". 35 Because of these im-
permissable risks of entanglement, the Court construed the National La-
bor Relations Act as not covering teachers in church-related schools.
b. Catholic Bishop and Church Records
The Catholic Bishop approach has been applied to regulatory inves-
tigations of church-related activity in which the state sought disclosure of
church records. In Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets,6 the Puerto Rico
Department of Consumer Affairs, as part of an ongoing investigation into
the operating costs and tuitions of private schools, issued a subpoena to
the Bishop to produce the financial records of the Puerto Rico Catholic
schools. The Bishop commenced suit in federal court to enjoin the inves-
tigation. The district court dismissed the complaint, but the First Circuit
reversed and ordered the trial court to issue the injunction. The First
Circuit reasoned that the underlying investigation posed a clear risk of
involving the government agency in the schools' decisions regarding "the
recruitment, allocation, and expenditure of their funds," decisions which
are "intimately bound up in their mission of religious education". The
court concluded that such involvement would: "permit. . . [the state] to
intrude upon decisions of religious authorities as to how much money
should be expended and how funds should best be allotted to serve the
religious goals of the schools . . . . [Such] involvement strikes us as a
relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of
church schools and hence of churches.' 38
c. Subsequent Cases
The Catholic Bishop-Surinach. approach has been followed in Ban-
34 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502 (emphasis added).
36 Id. at 503.
11 604 f.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979).
37 Id. at 78.
" Id. at 79 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971).
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gor Baptist Church v. State of Maine,39 Taylor v. City of Knoxville,"'
and Sylte v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville,4 ' all of which hold
that ongoing government investigation or regulation of church-related ac-
tivity can result in an impermissible entanglement.
d. Limits on Catholic Bishop
The Catholic Bishop-Surinach approach is not without its limita-
tions, as disclosed by the following cases in which the courts did not per-
ceive any impermissible entanglement resulting from government investi-
gation of church-related activity and records.
(i) In Cuesnongle v. Ramos,4 2 the First Circuit considered whether the
Puerto Rico Department of consumer Affairs' investigation of a college
affiliated with the Catholic Church posed the same entanglement con-
cerns as in Surinach. The Cuesnongle court held that it did not. The
court reasoned that unlike the parochial schools at issue in Surinach, the
college was not "pervasively sectarian" and thus "not primarily carrying
on a religious activity in the First Amendment sense". 43 Absent such a
"pervasively sectarian" nature, the court held that the potential for en-
tanglement was minimal.
(ii) In Donovan v. Central Baptist Church," the Secretary of labor
brought suit to enjoin the church from violating the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The church refused to answer interrogatories regarding its employ-
ees, claiming that its relationship with its employees was an integral part
of its ministry and that application of the minimum wage laws would
therefore entangle the government with the church. Although the court
recognized the potential validity of the church's contention, it held that
the issue went to the ultimate merits, not the discovery request, and
therefore ordered the church to answer. The court reasoned that the re-
quested information must be supplied "in order to enable the court to
have any meaningful basis to evaluate the First Amendment claims on
the merits". 9 The court distinguished Surinach on the ground that in
that case there was "no rational end product use of the information
which . . . [would] not encroach on . . . First Amendment rights,"
whereas "the same cannot be said of the information sought in this
case."'
46
" 549 F. Supp. 1208 (D.Me. 1982).
40 566 F. Supp. 925 (E.D.Tenn. 1982).
41 493 F. Supp. 313 (M.D.Tenn. 1980).
42 713 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 883.
.4 96 F.R.D. 4 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
Id. at 6.
Id. (emphasis added).
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(iii) In United States v. Freedom Church, 7 the IRS was investigating the
church's tax-exempt status and issued a subpoena to the church pastor to
produce all financial records of the church. When the church refused to
comply, the IRS petitioned for and received enforcement by the district
court. The First Circuit affirmed. In rejecting the church's First Amend-
ment argument, the court stressed that
[w]ere unconstitutional entanglement has been found, it has been in the
government's continuing monitoring or potential for regulating the reli-
gious activities under scrutiny .... In the present case, the IRS does not
seek to regulate or in any way become involved in the religious activities or
control the financial matters of the church. It merely seeks to make a deter-
mination based on all available and pertinent data of the church's tax ex-
empt status."4 8
(iv) Similar reasoning was expressed and similar results reached in
United States v. Holmes,4 and Ambassador College v. Geotzke,50 the free
exercise implications of which are discussed in Part III(B)(2) infra.
D. Summary of Entanglement Issues
Although the extent to which the entanglement concept limits civil
authority over church matters is unclear and still a point of judicial de-
velopment, an entanglement challenge to the underlying civil action
should be considered whenever church records are sought by government
or through government process. This is particularly true where the
records are sought by the government in litigation commenced by it or in
the course of ongoing regulatory activity. It is also true in litigation be-
tween private parties which affects internal church policy. For example,
suppose a Catholic school lay teacher is terminated for advocating pro-
abortion beliefs, and he then brings suit against the Diocesan schools for
wrongful termination and also directs a subpoena to the Bishop for docu-
ments relating to the abortion issue. The schools should defend the litiga-
tion on the ground that it involves matters of internal church policy be-
yond the scope of civil jurisdiction. The Bishop should move to quash the
subpoena on the same ground.
III. FREE EXERCISE LIMITS ON COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF CHURCH
RECORDS
If the foregoing entanglement defenses are unavailable to prevent
47 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979).
48 Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
49 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980).
" 675 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1982).
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disclosure of church records sought by civil authorities, disclosure may
possibly be avoided by reliance on the Free Exercise Clause, although the
courts have shown a reluctance to accept this defense.
A. Elements of a Free Exercise Violation
Whereas the Establishment Clause is concerned primarily with gov-
ernment involvement with religion in the institutional sense, the Free Ex-
ercise Clause protects against government "coercion" of individual reli-
gious freedom.5 1 Proof of a free exercise violation involves a two-part
analysis. first, the claimant must demonstrate that the challenged govern-
mental action (e.g., a subpoena directed to a Bishop and seeking church
records) "coerces" his religious liberty by placing substantial pressure on
him to violate a sincerely held and central tenet of his religion.2 Second,
if such a coercive effect is shown, the burden shifts to the state to demon-
strate that its infringement of religious freedom is justified by a suffi-
ciently "compelling state interest."53 An asserted state interest can be
"compelling" only if it is in the "least restrictive alternative" available
under the circumstances to achieve the governmental objective. 4
B. Free Exercise Implications of Compelled Disclosure of Church
Documents:
A subpoena demanding production of church-related documents and
records can implicate the Free Exercise Clause in two ways. First, the use
to which the disclosed information will be put may coerce or threaten
coercion of free exercise rights. Second, and more importantly, compelled
disclosure itself may contravene a religious requirement (such as a provi-
sion of the Code of Canon Law) that the information be maintained in
secrecy. Each of these possibilities is discussed below.
1. Use of Disclosed Church Records:
In Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets,5' discussed in Part II(C)(3)
above, the First Circuit also noted that the intended use of the school
financial records sought by the state threatened free exercise rights. The
court relied on the fact that Canon Law requires the Bishops to operate
" Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) ("a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not
be so attended").
o' See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
13 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403, 406-07; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15
(1972).
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
"6 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979).
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the Catholic schools to achieve "academic excellency and genuine Cathol-
icism." The court characterized this as a "religious duty" imposed on the
Bishops, and then reasoned that ongoing state supervision of the financial
operations of the schools could force the Bishops to violate or otherwise
compromise this duty. According to the court:
The Department [of Consumer Affairs] . . . may conclude that costs are
rising too fast and must be contained to a specified level. While such a de-
termination might be consistent with the Department's mandate, it surely
could clash with what is a religious belief and practice of those who admin-
ister these schools, namely that the highest quality education possible must
be provided to their students."6
The court concluded that the state had failed to show that this burden on
religion was justified by any compelling interest or that it was the least
restrictive means available.
2. Compelled Disclosure Alone as a Free Exercise Violation
The free exercise question in Surinach was decided on the basis of
the use which would be made of the subpoenaed documents. The court
also noted that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously impinge"
upon the free exercise of religion.57
a. Compelled Disclosure and Canon Law
Compelled disclosure of church records, in itself, could constitute a
free exercise violation where the subpoenaed documents are required by
church doctrine to be kept in secrecy. For example, the Code of Canon
law requires the Bishops to maintain certain documents in the secret
archives of the diocese. If a subpoena sought these documents, the Bishop
would be forced to chose between violating Canon Law or contempt of
civil authority. Such a conflict is precisely what the Free Exercise Clause
is intended to void.
b. Case Law
The case law dealing with the foregoing situation or analogous ones is
mixed, with nearly all courts holding that the subpoenaed documents
must be disclosed notwithstanding the potential free exercise violation.
The courts which have ruled in favor of disclosure generally have done so
on the ground that there was a "compelling" governmental need for the
information which outweighed any infringement of religious freedom. The
66 Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
Surinach, 604 F.2d at 79 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)) (emphasis
added).
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case law is summarized below.
(i) In Randle v. Cotter, a will contest, the petitioner issued a subpoena
duces tecum to the Archbishop of Los Angeles to produce the personnel
and psychiatric records of Father Patrick Cotter, one of the respondents
in the case. The court quashed the subpoena, partly on free exercise
grounds, although it gave no analysis to support its decision. This is the
only known case in which a court has wholeheartedly accepted a free ex-
ercise challenge to a subpoena seeking church documents.
(ii) In In re Rabbinical Seminary,5 8 a grand jury investigating possible
criminal violations of 18 U.S.C., Section 1001, which forbids the making
of false statements to a federal agency, issued a subpoena to a seminary
for its financial records and documents relating to student loan transac-
tions.59 The court denied the seminary's motion to quash, holding that
"[p]roduction of the demanded records would [not] violate any tenet of
Judaism. The grand jury has not required compliance with the subpoena
in a manner at odds with Jewish law or belief."60 The court also held that
enforcement of the subpoena was justified by the grand jury's role in
criminal prosecution. "While 'the first amendment right of free associa-
tion and freedom of religion reach within the closed doors of the grand
jury chamber . . ., the investigation of crime by the grand jury imple-
ments a fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the per-
son and property of the citizen' ,.
(iii) In United States v. Holmes,62 the IRS, as part of an investigation
into the tax-exempt status of a church, sought enforcement of a subpoena
requesting all financial records of the church. Although the Fifth Circuit
held that the subpoena was overbroad on statutory grounds, the court
rejected the church's free exercise argument, holding that "[b]alanced
against the incidental burden on church religious activities is the substan-
tial government interest in maintaining the integrity of its fiscal policies
... . This interest is sufficiently compelling to justify any incidental in-
fringement of plaintiff's First Amendment rights. '63
(iv) In Pagano v. Hadley," a Roman Catholic priest had commenced a
defamation action against law enforcement authorities. Defendants, seek-
ing discovery regarding plaintiff's reputation before and after the inci-
dent, served a subpoena duces tecum on the Bishop seeking documents in
the plaintiff's personnel file. The court rejected the Bishop's free exercise
Case No. NEP-26177 (Cal. Sup. Court 1983).
" 450 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
" Id. at 1081.
"O Id. at 1083 (quoting In re Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
" 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980).
*8 Id. at 990.
Case No. 81-381-WKS (D. Del. 1984).
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argument that disclosure could violate Canon Law, and ordered enforce-
ment of the subpoena.
(v) In Roman Catholic Diocese of Tucson v. Superior Court,5 the court
reached a similar result as in the Pagano case. A Catholic priest had com-
menced a defamation suit in state court against his former parishioners,
and the parishioners served a subpoena duces tecum on the Bishop seek-
ing the priest's personnel records. The Bishop commenced an action in
federal court to enjoin enforcement of the subpoena. The federal court
denied the Bishop's motion for a preliminary injunction. Although the
court recognized that "the Church is threatened with a violation of its law
of secrecy," it held that the countervailing "state interest is of the highest
order - the state is fulfilling its basic function of rendering justice be-
tween citizens." The court found support for this conclusion in that the
information sought was not available elsewhere, and the state court had
ordered that the records could be used only for purposes of trial but oth-
erwise must remain confidential. The court concluded by stating that
"[t]he Diocese has made one potentially convincing objection - that the
order will require Church officials to violate Canon Law. But there is no
apparent way to accommodate defendants' needs that will result in any
lesser violation of Canon Law." The case is currently on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit.
(vi) In Ambassador College v. Geotzke," the sole heir of a decedent
brought suit in state court against a church-affiliated college, claiming
that the college had used undue influence and fraud to obtain property
under decedent's will. The college refused on First Amendment grounds
to answer discovery requests seeking information as to the college's finan-
cial matters. As a sanction, the state trial court entered judgment against
the college, and the state appellate courts affirmed. The college then com-
menced this action in federal court for a declaratory judgment that the
sanctions imposed in state court violated the college's First Amendment
rights. The federal district court dismissed the complaint for lack of a
colorable constitutional question, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The
court stressed that free exercise considerations are minimal in a suit be-
tween private parties, where "[tjhere is no danger of government seeking
to monitor or regulate a religious group. " 67 The Geotzke court held:
[T]he church must respond to discovery requests as any other similarly
situated litigant would be required. As the Supreme Court stated in
Cantwell . . ., 'Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to imply
that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit
frauds upon the public.' In the instant case the appellants are accused of
" Case No. 83-578 (D. Ariz. 1983).
675 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1982).
67 Id. at 664.
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taking questionable actions, bordering upon fraud. The raising of a first
amendment right does not require a balancing test of the interests involved
in discovery. 8
c. Criticism
Although most of the courts which have compelled disclosure of
church documents have done so on a finding of a "compelling state inter-
est," few have considered whether compelled disclosure was "the least re-
strictive alternative" under the circumstances. This should be an impor-
tant consideration in two inter-related respects. First, the court should
consider whether the requested documents are "necessary," or whether
the litigation or other governmental action can reasonably proceed with-
out the documents. Second, and perhaps more significantly, the court
should consider whether the subpoenaed documents or the information
therein is available elsewhere (such as in the form of oral testimony). If
either factor is present, compelled disclosure would not be the least re-
strictive alternative available.
C. Summary of Free Exercise Issues
Thus far, more courts have not looked favorably upon free exercise
challenges to subpoenas seeking church records, even where enforcement
of the subpoena will cause the custodian of the documents to violate a
religious belief. Because of the potential for damaging precedent, careful
consideration should be given before raising a free exercise defense.
IV. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CHURCH-
RELATED DOCUMENTS
In addition to protection provided by the religion clauses, the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of association and free speech may, in
appropriate cases, be available to prevent compelled disclosure of church-
related records.
A. Free Association
In Buckley v. Valeo,69 the Court stated that "compelled disclosure, in
itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaran-
teed by the First Amendment"." In United States v. Freedom Church,71
the court held that freedom of association can prevent compelled disclos-
" Id. at 664-65 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 306 (1940))(emphasis added).
69 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
7" Id. at 64.
7' 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979).
DISCOVERY OF CHURCH RECORDS
ure of church-related documents if "the party asserting the constitutional
privilege .. .show[s] that disclosure of the information will be prejudi-
cial to those asserting the privilege, such as exposure to public hostility,
or deterrence of free association, or denial of anonymity where there is
reason therefor. '7 2 If such a prejudicial effect is shown, the burden shifts
to the government to demonstrate a compelling interest which justifies
the invasion of First Amendment right. 73
B. Free Speech
At least in the area of state investigation and regulation of educa-
tional activities by church-related schools, the Free Speech Clause may be
available to prevent state regulation, and thereby preclude compelled dis-
closure of church-related records. Teaching is considered a form of pro-
tected speech.7 4 In Cuesnongle v. Ramos,7 5 the court held that the free
speech protection accorded to academic freedom and operation of schools
can prevent state investigation and regulation if the government action
would have a chilling effect on protected rights.76
V. NONCONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF PROTECTION
In addition to the possible protection afforded by the First Amend-
ment, protection of church-related documents and records against dis-
closure to civil authorities may also be available through common law or
statutory privilege - the "priest-penitent" or "clergyman's" privilege -
or through special statutes enacted to protect church records.
A. The Priest-Penitent Privilege
The privilege is generally governed by state law, and thus varies de-
pending upon the jurisdiction. A few generalizations are set forth below.
1. Historical Basis
The priest-penitent privilege did not exist at common law.7 How-
ever, all but a very few states have now enacted statutes which extend
protection to confidential communications to members of the clergy.7s
71 Id. at 320 (quoting Bronner v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 368, 371 (1979)).
" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64-65.
7' Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("academic freedom ... is ... a
special concern of the First Amendment"); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
75 713 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1983).
Id. at 884-86.
8 J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2394 (1961).
71 C. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 77, at 158 (2d ed. 1972); Reese, Confidential Communica-
tions To The Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55 (1963).
30 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN, 1986
2. Scope of the Privilege
The statutes which create the privilege are of two general types:
those, such as Uniform Rule of Evidence 29, which recognize the privilege
but limit it to "confession of culpable conduct made secretly and in confi-
dence by a penitent to a priest in the course of discipline or practice of
the church"; and more recent enactments which expand the privilege to
all matters of spiritual advice if disclosure thereof would violate a sacred
or moral trust." Even under the broader formulation of the privilege, the
following elements must be present: (a) The communication must be in-
tended to be confidential and must be held in confidence.80 (b) The cler-
gyman must be acting in his capacity as a clergyman.81 (c) The communi-
cations must relate to spiritual or religious matters.8 2
3. The Privilege in Federal Court
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, a federal court exercising fed-
eral question jurisdiction is not bound to follow state statutory privileges.
However, the federal courts apparently accept the priest-penitent privi-
lege as a matter of federal "common law."83
B. Special Statutes
Louisiana has enacted a special statute designed to protect certain
confidential church records from compelled disclosure. The statute (R.S.
§ 13:3734.2) protects the records of church tribunals on matters relating
to marital status or rights.
VI. PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN PROTECTING CHURCH-RELATED DOCUMENTS
The foregoing discussion deals with the substantive bases for protecting
church-related documents and records from compelled disclosure. The re-
mainder of this outline addresses the procedural issues which might arise,
particularly with respect to attacks upon subpoenas. A related topic is the
extent to which federal courts can adjudicate the validity of subpoenas
issued by the parallel state courts.
" C. MCCORMICK, supra note 78, at § 177, at 158.
80 United States v. Webb, 615 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1980).
" See United States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478, 486 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Wells, 446
F.2d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1971).
11 United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1971). Cf. In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433
(C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that the privilege extends to selective service counselling involving
"deep and intimate spiritual and moral considerations").
SS See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d
275, 277-81 (D.C. Cir. 1958); In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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A. Civil Litigation
Under Rule 45(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the person
to whom a subpoena duces tecum is directed may move the court to
quash the subpoena on the ground that it is "unreasonable and
oppressive."
1. Claim of Privilege
Rule 45, governing subpoenas, is read in light of Rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which provide the basis for asserting that the documents
sought are subject to a privilege, constitutional or otherwise.
2. Deposition Subpoena
If the subpoena duces tecum is for production at deposition rather
than trial, the party to whom the subpoena is directed can avoid the ne-
cessity of a motion to quash by objecting under Rule 45(d) to the attor-
ney designated in the subpoena, thereby placing the .burden of going to
court on the party seeking the documents.
B. Criminal Litigation
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) provides that a person to
whom a subpoena duces tecum is directed may move the court to quash
the subpoena on the ground that it is "unreasonable or oppressive." Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 and Federal Rule of Evidence 501
form the basis for assertion that the subpoenaed documents are privi-
leged. Also, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(a), pertaining to depo-
sitions in criminal proceedings, states that only non-privileged matters
can be the subject of a deposition.
C. IRS Administrative Subpoenas
26 U.S.C. Section 7602 authorized the IRS to issue subpoenas in aid
of its administrative proceedings and investigations, and to seek enforce-
ment in federal district court. There are two limitations on IRS'subpoena
authority as it relates to churches and church records.
1. Good Faith Test
All IRS subpoenas are subject to a four-part "good faith" test: (a) the
IRS investigation is being conducted for a legitimate purpose; (b) the spe-
cific inquiry is relevant to that purpose; (c) the information sought is not
already in IRS possession; and (d) all administrative steps imposed by
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the Internal Revenue Code have been followed. "
2. Statutory Limitation
26 U.S.C. Section 7605(a) provides that:
[N]o examination of the books of account of a church ... shall be made to
determine whether such organization may be engaged in the carrying on of
an unrelated trade or business or may be otherwise engaged in activities
which may be subject to tax as . . . business income of exempt organiza-
tions . . ., unless the Secretary. . . believes that such organization may be
so engaged and so notifies the organization in advance of the examination.
No examination of the religious activities of such an organization shall be
made except to the extent necessary to determine whether such organiza-
tion is a church. . ., and no examination of the books of account of such an
organization shall be made other than to the extent necessary to determine
the amount of tax imposed by this title.85
D. Federal-State Comity Issues
Where the subpoena is issued by a state court (or administrative
agency), considerations of res judicata and federalism may prevent the
party to whom the subpoena is directed from challenging the subpoena
on constitutional grounds in federal court.
1. Res Judicata
If the party to whom the subpoena is directed moves to quash the
subpoena in state court and the motion is denied, res judicata will bar a
collateral attack on the subpoena in federal court if the state court deci-
sion on the motion is deemed "final" under state law."
2. Federalism
Even if the party to whom the subpoena is directed does not move to
quash in state court, federalism principles as announced in Younger v.
Harris,87 may preclude a federal court from enjoining enforcement of the
subpoena. This would be particularly true where the state is a party to
the state court litigation.8
See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); United States v. Freedom Church, 613
F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818 (9th Cir.
1975).
I.R.C. § 7605(a) (West Supp. 1986).
86 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4469 (1981).
87 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
" See Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982); C.
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3. Other Federal State Questions
Res judicata and the Younger doctrine are the two most significant
obstacles to invoking federal court jurisdiction to challenge a state court
subpoena. By way of contrast, exhaustion of remedies and the federal
anti-injunction statute"' should not preclude federal jurisdiction in such a
case. A federal court challenge to a state court subpoena would be based
on 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. There is no requirement of exhaustion of state
administrative or judicial remedies prior to commencement of a Section
1983 action in federal court.90
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 4251-4255 (1981).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
90 Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668
(1963). Also, Section 1983 is one of the exceptions to the anti-injunction statute. Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
